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Abstract— If robots are to cooperate with humans in an 
increasingly human-like manner, then significant progress 
must be made in their abilities to observe and learn to perform 
novel goal directed actions in a flexible and adaptive manner.   
The current research addresses this challenge. In CHRIS.I [1], 
we developed a platform-independent perceptual system that 
learns from observation to recognize human actions in a way 
which abstracted from the specifics of the robotic platform, 
learning actions including “put X on Y” and “take X”.   In the 
current research, we extend this system from action perception 
to execution, consistent with current developmental research in 
human understanding of goal directed action and teleological 
reasoning.  We demonstrate the platform independence with 
experiments on three different robots.  In Experiments 1 and 2 
we complete our previous study of perception of actions “put” 
and “take” demonstrating how the system learns to execute 
these same actions, along with new related actions “cover” and 
“uncover” based on the composition of action primitives “grasp 
X” and “release X at Y”.  Significantly, these compositional 
action execution specifications learned on one iCub robot are 
then executed on another, based on the abstraction layer of 
motor primitives.  Experiment 3 further validates the platform-
independence of the system, as a new action that is learned on 
the iCub in Lyon is then executed on the Jido robot in 
Toulouse.  In Experiment 4 we extended the definition of action 
perception to include the notion of agency, again inspired by 
developmental studies of agency attribution, exploiting the 
Kinect motion capture system for tracking human motion.  
Finally in Experiment 5 we demonstrate how the combined 
representation of action in terms of perception and execution 
provides the basis for imitation.  This provides the basis for an 
open ended cooperation capability where new actions can be 
learned and integrated into shared plans for cooperation.  Part 
of the novelty of this research is the robots’ use of spoken 
language understanding and visual perception to generate 
action representations in a platform independent manner based 
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on physical state changes.  This provides a flexible capability 
for goal-directed action imitation.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
For embodied agents that perceive and act in the world, 
there is a strong coupling or symmetry between perception 
and execution which is constructed around the notion of goal 
directed action.  Hommel et al [2] propose a philosophy for 
the cognitive mechanisms underlying perception and action 
– the Theory of Event Coding.  According to this theory, the 
stimulus representations underlying action perception, and 
the sensorimotor representations underlying action are not 
coded separately, but instead are encoded in a common 
representational format.  In this context it has now become 
clearly established that neurons in the parietal and the 
premotor cortices encode simple actions both for the 
execution of these actions as well as for the perception of 
these same actions when they performed by a second agent 
[3]. This research corroborates the emphasis from behavioral 
studies on the importance of the goal (rather than the details 
of the means) in action perception [4]. 
Within a sensorimotor architecture a number of benefits 
derive from such a format, including the direct relation 
between action perception and execution that can provide 
the basis for imitation.  This is consistent with our previous 
research in the domain of robot perception and action in the 
context of cooperation ([5, 6]).  The current research extends 
our previous work on the learning of composite actions by 
exploiting this proposed relation between action execution 
and perception.  Part of the novelty of the current research is 
that the action repertoire is open:  the robot can learn new 
actions in both dimensions of perception and execution. The 
learned actions take arguments including agent, object and 
recipient.  Maintaining this symmetry of action perception 
and execution lays the framework for imitation and the use 
of imitation in cooperation [5, 6]. 
We look to human development to extract requirements 
on how to implement such an action representation.  In this 
context, two important skills for infants are the ability to 
detect an action as being goal directed and to determine its 
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agency. Studies of infant action perception [4, 7] have led to 
the extraction of a core set of conditions which allows the 
infant to identify goal-directed actions. In the current 
research, we implement in our system the ability to address 
aspects of these human requirements both in terms of 
perception (detect and represent salient actions effects) and 
execution (ability to achieve a goal through an action using 
equifinal variations). We demonstrate how those capabilities 
can be used by the robot to imitate or mirror human actions 
(which involve both recognition and execution) in a way that 
should match the human requirements for goal attribution.  
Learning by imitation is a major area of research in robot 
cognition today [8-12]. Our novel contribution to this 
domain is the encoding of action in terms of perceptual state 
changes and composed motor primitives that can achieve 
these state changes, in a manner that allows the robot to 
learn new actions as perception – execution pairs, and then 
use this knowledge to perceive and imitate.  These actions 
can take several arguments, e.g. AGENT put the 
OBJECT on the RECIPIENT. This allows for the 
generalization of learned actions to entirely new contexts, 
with new objects and agents.  In our long-term research 
program, this provides the basis for learning to perform joint 
cooperative tasks purely through observation. 
 
II. CONTEXT: GOAL DIRECTED ACTIONS 
A. Goals attribution requirements 
Studies of human infants [4, 13-15] indicate that their 
ability to determine the goal of an action begins to develop 
between 6 and 9 months, demonstrated by the ability of 
infants to encode behaviors such as a hand grasping for an 
object as being directed at the goal-object rather than 
encoding the hand’s specific movement. An important issue 
that has been discussed within the field is the difference 
between actions that are familiar to the infant and more 
unfamiliar actions which may not include human features 
(like a robotic gripper grasping a toy). Woodward [14] 
initially argued that only observed actions that the infant is 
able to execute herself are represented as goal-directed. 
However later studies [4, 7] demonstrated that indeed infants 
are able to attribute goal directedness for novel actions early 
assuming two conditions: first the action has to produce a 
salient effect on the world state (like the motion from one 
place to another). The second condition is that the agent is 
able to achieve the same state change in different ways (such 
as avoiding an obstacle instead of using a straight 
trajectory), in other words the action is demonstrated to 
possess equifinal variations. 
 
 
B. Implementing those requirements 
Our implementation of action, both in the context of 
perception from CHRIS.I [1] and execution is based on 
actions as state changes. One of the strong implications of 
this is the equifinality of action. That is, the same action “put 
the box on the toy” may be realized in a variety of ways 
(with one hand, or the other) but with the equivalent final 
outcome, one of the key characteristics that allow action to 
be considered goal directed.  If the robot is able to 
demonstrate equifinal means of achieving his actions, then 
humans may be more likely to attribute a goal to them. This 
assumption has been shown to be true in infants [4, 16] and 
would need to be tested on adults, however assuming the 
fact that all our teleological system seems to be built on 
those core capabilities it is likely that a benefactor effect 
could be found also on adults. 
In our action recognition system [1] we exploited 
Mandler’s [17] suggestion that the infant begins to construct 
meaning from the scene based on the extraction of 
perceptual primitives.  From simple representations such as 
contact, support and attachment [18] the infant could 
construct progressively more elaborate representations of 
visuospatial meaning.  In this context, the physical event 
"collision" can be derived from the perceptual primitive 
"contact".  Kotovsky & Baillargeon [19] observed that at 6 
months, infants demonstrate sensitivity to the parameters of 
objects involved in a collision, and the resulting effect on the 
collision, suggesting indeed that infants can represent 
contact as an event predicate with agent and patient 
arguments.   
In this paper we describe an evolution of the action 
recognition system described in [1]. This new system is still 
based on sequences of perceptual event primitives (visibility, 
motion, contact), however those primitives are now 
represented in terms of the impact they have on the world 
state. Primitives can be queued and their effects added so 
that a sequence of them will be a way to reach an end state 
from an initial state. If a sequence produces no change in the 
world state, then it will not be taken into account by the 
system, which mimics the ability of children to emphasis 
actions that produce a salient effect on the world. This 
rejection of “useless” actions allow the system to be more 
stable: for example an object which appears and then 
disappears quickly may be only a false recognition of the 
perceptual system. 
These requirements are implemented on both the 
perceptual and executive components of the system.  In 
CHRIS.I [1] we presented a system architecture for 
cooperation.  Here we zoom in on the action related 
components which handle the complete link from perception 
to motor commands in term of actions. 
 
  
III. EXPERIMENTAL PLATFORMS 
A crucial aspect of our research is that the architecture 
should allow knowledge acquired on one robot to be used on 
physically distinct platforms.  In the current study this is 
demonstrated using two different version of the iCub 
platform in Lyon France, and Genoa Italy, respectively, and 
the Jido robot in Toulouse, France.   
The iCub [20] is an open-source robotic platform shaped 
as three and a half year-old child (about 104cm tall), with 53 
degrees of freedom distributed on the head, arms, hands and 
legs. The head has 6 degrees of freedom (roll, pan and tilt in 
the neck, tilt and independent pan in the eyes). Three 
degrees of freedom are allocated to the waist, and 6 to each 
leg (three, one and two respectively for the hip, knee and 
ankle). The arms have 7 degrees of freedom, three in the 
shoulder, one in the elbow and three in the wrist. The iCub 
has been specifically designed to study manipulation, for 
this reason the number of degrees of freedom of the hands 
has been maximized with respect to the constraint of the 
small size. The hands of the iCub have five fingers and 19 
joints. All the code and documentation is provided open 
source by the RobotCub Consortium, together with the 
hardware documentation and CAD drawings. The robot 
hardware is based on high-performance electric motors 
controlled by a DSP-based custom electronics. From the 
sensory point of view the robot is equipped with cameras, 
microphones, gyroscopes, position sensors in all joints, 
force/torque sensors in each limb. 
While both iCubs are instances of the iCub, they are 
distinct in the implementation of motor control as the 
iCubGenoa01 is equipped with force sensors that allow force 
control; the iCubLyon01 is only controlled in velocity and 
position modes.  Thus, the essential role of the motor 
primitive pool as the common abstraction layer across robots 
is maintained.  Jido, on the other hand is an entirely different 
robot, which allows us to truly explore the platform 
independence of our system. 
Jido is a fully-equipped mobile manipulator that has been 
constructed in the framework of Cogniron (IST FET project: 
www.cogniron.org). Jido, a MP-L655 platform from 
Neobotix, is a mobile robot designed to interact with human 
beings. It is presented on figure 3.  Jido is equipped with: (i) 
a 6-DOF arm, (ii) a pantilt unit system at the top of a mast 
(dedicated to human-robot interaction mechanisms), (iii) a 
3D swissranger camera and (iv) a stereo camera, both 
embedded on the pan tilt unit, (v) a second video system 
fixed on the arm wrist for object grasping, (vi) two laser 
scanners, (vii) one panel PC with tactile screen for 
interaction purpose, and (viii) one screen to provide 
feedback to the robot user. Jido has been endowed with 
functions enabling to act as robot companion and especially 
to exchange objects with human beings. So, it embeds robust 
and ecient basic navigation and object recognition 
abilities.    
 
IV. THE CHRIS ARCHITECTURE – FOCUS ON ACTION 
In order to be platform-independent, action representation is 
abstracted from platform-specificities at the lowest level 
possible.  An overview of the CHRIS architecture in this 
context is presented in Figure1.   
 
 
Figure 1: CHRIS Architecture. Arrows represent the flow of information 
(data, commands), which are transported  over the network via YARP.  
Perceptual information enters Scene Perception. Object positions from 
Egosphere are processed by Primitive Recognizer and Action Recognizer 
for learning and recognition, and enter SPARK  for inference of spatial 
relations which are stored in ORO.  Shared Plan Manager links perceputal 
and exectutive action representations and plans. Supervisor manages HRI, 
the learning of new action execution, and verificiation from ORO that 
execution preconditions hold. 
 
A. Abstraction of Action Perception and Execution 
Two layers of abstractions are required in order to have a 
platform independent architecture: perceptual and motor. 
Both of them rely on the Egosphere module. 
 
1) Scene Perception 
The first layer of abstraction between the sensory 
perception systems and the higher level cognitive 
architecture and motor control elements is formed at the 
level of the Egosphere which serves as a fast, dynamic, 
asynchronous storage of object positions and orientations. 
The object positions are stored in spherical coordinates 
(radius, azimuth and elevation) and the object orientation is 
stored as rotations of the object reference frame about the 
three axes (x,y,z) of a right-handed Cartesian world-frame 
system. The origin of the world frame can be chosen 
arbitrarily and, for our experimental work, we located it at 
the centre of the robot’s base-frame. Other stored object 
properties are a visibility flag and the objectID. The 
objectID is a unique identifier of an object which acts as a 
shared key across several databases (see [1] for details). The 
robot-specific 3D perception system adds objects to the 
Egosphere when they are first perceived, and maintains 
position, orientation or visibility of these objects over time. 
Modules requiring spatial information about objects in the 
scene can query the Egosphere. The Egosphere is 
  
implemented in C++ as a client-server system using the 
YARP infrastructure. Software modules requiring access to 
the Egosphere include a client class which provides methods 
like addObject(), setObject(), getObject() or 
getNumberOfObjects(), etc.  The Egosphere is thus a 
convenient abstraction layer. With increasing complexity of 
human-robot interaction tasks during the course of our 
research, we will add further complexity (human focus of 
attention, confidence, timeliness etc.) whilst preserving 
modularity.  This is exemplified by the spatial reasoning 
(e.g. visibility by line of sight) provided by Spark.  Within 
the Jido platform-independent component, the functionality 
of the EgoSphere is preserved within Spark. 
 
2) Perceptual Primitives, Events and State Changes 
The action recognition capability is based on the 
extraction of meaningful primitive events from the flow of 
object positions and visibilities represented in the Egosphere 
and Spark. Again we based our system findings from 
developmental psychology.  We implemented perceptual 
primitives similar to those described in [21-25]. We have 
previously used this primitives based approach in [26, 27] 
and we identified a core set of primitive events that are 
simple and provide a solid basis for action construction. 
There are six primitive event divided in three categories: 
• Visibility (object appears or disappears) 
• Motion (object starts or stops moving) 
• Contact (contact made or broken between 2 objects) 
Each of these primitive event is coded in terms of the state 
change it effects on the world (e.g: if an object appears, 
visibility(object) will be added to the world state). The 
Primitive Recognizer extracts those 6 primitives by 
constantly monitoring the Egosphere.  It then broadcasts the 
detected events to the Action Recognizer.  
  
3) Motor Primitives 
The current research extends this notion of 
compositionality for action perception from CHRIS.I [1] to 
action execution. As for the perceptual system, the action 
execution system requires a suitable abstraction that 
provides a platform independent interface to the robot motor 
capabilities.  Motor primitives   rely on the idea that 
complex motor tasks may be achieved by the combination of 
simple parameterized controllers we call primitives. This 
framework is consistent  with studies of biological motion 
[28], which demonstrate that motion of biological beings is 
achieved by high level motor commands triggering a 
sequence of motor primitives leading finally to an effective 
motion of the muscles. Using hierarchies of primitives for 
control in robotics is becoming a widely used method [29-
36]. In our approach, what we call a Motor Primitive is 
already a symbolic action. The implementation of those 
actions is robot specific, what is important is that all robots 
share the same motor interface, as a pool of Motor 
Primitives. In the current system the primitives that are 
implemented on the robot are: 
 
• Grasp (object) 
• Release (location) 
• Touch (object) 
• Look-At (object) 
 
We do not claim the completeness of this pool for all 
possible interactions, but these primitives were sufficient in 
the context of robot and human interaction through 
manipulation of objects on a table. The arguments for these 
primitives are objects whose Cartesian coordinates are 
recovered from the Egosphere.   
B. Action Representation 
The concept of Action and its representation is at the center 
of our architecture. Inspired by the perception-execution 
symmetry [2] we impose the requirement that the same data 
structure shall accommodate both the perceptual and 
executive components of action. It also includes teleological 
information, that is, the state changes that are induced by 
that action. 
  
1) Action Representation for Perception 
Our representation of action started with a purely 
perceptual definition [1, 6, 37]. Specifically the Action 
Recognizer module is constantly monitoring the flow of 
perceptual primitives sent by the Primitive Recognizer 
module. We make the assumption that two actions will be 
separated by a temporal delay, so we can use this delay to 
segment meaningful sequences of primitives. When such an 
independent sequence is detected, it is tagged as being a 
potential action which is then evaluated by the recognition 
process. The action data structure is similar to that for events 
since actions are composed of primitive events, and both 
produce a salient change (or changes) in the world state. The 
Action Recognizer stores a list of all the known actions and 
compares them with the incoming potential actions. All the 
primitives contained in the received sequence are added so 
that the global world state change of this sequence is 
obtained, then if a known action creates the same change in 
the environment it is recognized as being the observed 
action. We have to stress the fact that this “world change” is 
argument independent: if the system has learnt an action 
cover(object A, object B) then it will recognize a 
cover(toy,box) as well as a cover(bowl, plate). 
Actions possess characteristics in addition to those of 
event primitives. The state change produced by an event 
primitive is called post-condition, because it is applied after 
the primitive occurred.  In addition to post-conditions an 
action has pre-conditions which can either allow or prevent 
it to occur (for example covering the bowl needs the bowl to 
be visible and uncover the bowl needs the bowl to be 
covered). Those pre/post conditions are a useful mechanism 
that allows forward/backward chaining and finally 
teleological reasoning (see [37] for more details about this 
aspect). Actions also contain a field describing the executing 
  
agent. Agency detection is based on motion primitives 
associated with human hands that are detected using the 
Kinect device which provides information about human 
hands to the Egosphere (see below).  
 
2) Action Representation for Execution 
In order to bridge the gap between perception and 
execution, the Shared Plan Manager module combines motor 
representations with perceptual representations of action.  
While we currently address the learning of single actions as 
the simplest motor plans, the system is designed to naturally 
extend to more complex shared plans, based on our earlier 
work [6].   
When the user asks the robot to perform an action the 
Shared Plan Manager searches for a plan with that name.   If 
no such plan is found, then the Shared Plan Manager asks 
the user to enumerate the motor primitives (described above) 
that constitute that action. 
The system can thus learn to perform complex actions 
such as put the box on the toy as a composite 
sequence of grasp box, release box on toy   
We implement a form of argument binding so that this 
newly learned action can generalize across all objects.  That 
is the robot can then perform the action put the toy on 
the table.   
 
 
Figure 2: Experiments on iCubLyon01 and iCubGenoa01.  A. Experiments 
1 and 2 where human teaches robot new actions.  Note in right foreground 
the representation of the spatial environment in SPARK. B. Replication of 
actions learned in Lyon with iCubLyon01 transferred to iCubGenoa01 in 
Genoa. C.  Human demonstrates the “cover the toy with the box” action, 
and the iCubGenoa01 recognizes and imitates that action. 
 
C. Supervision 
Action perception and execution are coordinated by the HRI 
Supervisor. The Supervisor manages spoken language 
interaction with the CSLU Toolkit [38] Rapid Application 
Development (RAD) state-based dialog system which 
combines state-of-the-art speech synthesis (Festival) and 
recognition (Sphinx-II recognizer) in a GUI programming 
environment. Our system is thus state based, with the user 
indicating the nature of the current task (including whether 
he wants interact in the context of action recognition, 
execution or imitation tasks).  In each of these subdomains, 
the user can then indicate that he is ready to show the robot a 
new example and the robot will attempt to recognize, 
perform or learn what is shown.   
A principal function of the Supervisor is to verify that 
preconditions for action execution are met before the 
execution is initiated.  This primarily concerns the constraint 
that objects to be manipulated should be visible.  This 
information is computed by the SPARK (Spatial Reasoning 
and Knowledge) module and made available to the system in 
ORO (the Open Robot Ontology) which provides central 
component of the Knowledge base of the system.  See 
CHRIS.I [1] for details. 
 
V. EXPERIMENTS 
A. Experiment 1- Completing Perception with Execution 
In CHRIS.I we demonstrated a capability to learn to 
recognize actions including take and put.  Here we first 
demonstrate how these action definitions can be completed 
with the execution component.   
 
H: Put the toy on the left 
R: I don’t know how to put. 
H: Grasp the toy. 
R: Grasping the toy. 
H:  Release left 
R:  Releasing left 
H: Finish learning. 
 
Based on this learning we then demonstrated that the 
acquired execution knowledge could generalize to new 
instances of the action.  We demonstrated that the robot 
correctly performed the command to put the box in the 
middle.  This is illustrated in Fig 2A.  In order to 
demonstrate that this knowledge could be exploited on a 
different robot, the learned definitions were shared via the 
SVN repository.  Figure 2B illustrates the iCubGenoa01 
using action definitions acquired in Lyon in order to perform 
the take and put actions. 
 
B.  Experiment 2- Learning New Actions 
This experiment tests the ability of the system to learn 
new actions, both in terms of perception and execution.  
Here we focus on two actions which are cover X with 
Y, and uncover X with Y.  We chose these actions as 
they will provide the basis for future work in shared 
planning for cooperation. 
 
H: Cover the toy with the box. 
R:  I do not know how to cover. 
  
H: Grasp the box. 
R: Grasping the box. 
H: Release the box on the toy. 
R:  Releasing the box on the toy. 
H: Finish learning. 
 
This dialog fragment illustrates how the system can 
acquire new sequences of action primitives in order to learn 
new composite actions.  Here, “cover X with Y” is learned 
as the concatenation of grasp X and release X at Y. We 
demonstrated this same concatenative learning for the 
actions, put, take, cover and uncover.  Note that put and 
cover have similar definitions, with reversed ordering of the 
arguments, demonstrating the flexibility of the argument 
binding capability. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Above - Experimental platform Jido.  The action of taking the box 
and putting it on the red-mat (cover X with Y) that was learned on  
iCubLyon01 was successfully executed in the Jido environment in 
Toulouse. A - B. Jido reaching for box and grasping. C – D. Jido puts box 
on red table mat. 
 
C. Experiment 3 – Cross platform generalization 
The Shared Plan Manager creates permanent definitions 
of these new actions, which can then be transferred via the 
SVN system for use on other robots at other sites.  We could 
thus test the definition of Cover X with Y that was 
learned on the iCub in Lyon on the Jido robot in Toulouse.   
Via the RAD Supervisor, the human asked Jido cover the 
red table-mat with the box (see Figure 3).  The Supervisor 
retrieved the composite action definition, communicated the 
corresponding motor primitives corresponding to grasp X 
and release X on Y to Jido.  Jido was thus able to 
produce the cover X with Y action, based on learning 
that had occurred on a morphologically distinct robot.  Thus, 
despite this morphological difference, because of the 
abstraction at both perceptual and execution levels, action 
knowledge acquired on one platform can be exploited on 
another. 
 
D. Experiment 4 - Agency assignment with Kinect 
In behavior that involves object manipulation, the human 
hand has a special status as an agent.  Indeed it has been 
shown that infants may prefer to assign agency to well 
known agents however they also rely on naïve physics and 
assign agency to objects that are moving on their own and in 
specific ways [4, 39]. In order to achieve accurate hand 
tracking we demonstrate here how the Kinect motion tracker 
can provide this capability. A module has been developed 
using the Kinect device in combination with OpenNI 
drivers1 in order to track the user hands and add them to the 
Egosphere as standard objects. Since this module is on the 
platform specific side of the Egosphere, then no change is 
required to use its information. We achieved the same result 
using our standard vision system and visual markers on the 
human hand; however the approach with the Kinect is much 
more natural and robust. In the experiment the user was 
teaching system how to recognize cover and uncover and the 
system recognized these actions, and which hand performed 
them so it could describe it in the following way: “I detected 
that the human hand covered the toy with the box”. 
 
E. Experiment 5 – Goal Directed Action Imitation 
This experiment, illustrated in detail in Figure 4, brings all 
of the functionality together.  To arrive at this point, the 
robot should be able to both recognize and execute a set of 
actions.  Here we demonstrate this with the cover the 
toy with the box action.  This is illustrated briefly in 
Figure 2C and 2D.  Figure 2C illustrates the human user 
showing the action to the robot.  Figure 2D illustrates the 
robot now performing the recognized action.  Full detail of 
 
1
 Kinect is a hardware product by Microsoft (http://www.xbox.com/en-
US/kinect). OpenNI.org release open source drivers for the Kinect device 
(http://openni.org/).  
  
the experiment is provided in Figure 4.  A video 
demonstrating this experiment is attached with the paper. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Experiment 5.  Imitation.  A. Calibration of hand recognition with 
Kinect. B-D. Human covers toy with box. E. Human repositions objects. F. 
Robot grasps box. G-I. Robot covers toy with box, completing the imitation. 
 
 
VI. DISCUSSION 
 Many of the mirroring skills demonstrated in the 
literature [40, 41] use the perceived motor state of the agent 
(i.e. its kinematic evolution over the action) to both 
recognize and execute actions. This has been combined with 
goal-based representations [10].  Our system is based on the 
fact that each action can be recognized by its perceptual 
consequences in changes in the world state (object states) 
and then performed by executing the associated motor 
commands. Those motor commands are not robot specific, 
but the primitives they call are, which implicitly solves the 
correspondence problem described in [8, 42]. Although we 
cannot argue that our system can cope with the same range 
of actions as a “trajectory based” systems, it is 
complimentary with such systems, and can be used at a 
higher level, for actions involving multiple arguments and 
symbolic goal achievement more than precise motor 
imitation. Indeed, this approach also emphasis the equifinal 
means of an action since the user can demonstrate an action 
and then the robot will achieve the same result with 
completely different trajectories. 
Aspects of this work can thus be considered in the context 
of learning by imitation or demonstration, which is a major 
area of research in robot cognition today [8, 10, 40-42].  Our 
novel contributions to this domain include (1) the encoding 
of action in terms of perceptual state changes and composed 
motor primitives that can achieve these state changes, in a 
manner that allows the robot to learn new actions as 
perception – execution pairs, and then use this knowledge to 
perceive and imitate. (2)  These actions can take several 
arguments, e.g. AGENT put the OBJECT on the 
RECIPIENT, which allows for the generalization of 
learned actions to entirely new contexts, with new objects 
and agents.  This yields the equifinal component of action 
where the same goal can be achieved by different means. (3) 
We use spoken language interaction and visual perception to 
provide learning input to the system.  In our long term 
research program, this provides that basis for learning to 
perform cooperative shared tasks purely through 
observation. 
In our system actions are encoded using the effect they 
produce on the state of the world, the latter being abstracted 
in terms of unspecific quantities like relative position and 
orientation of objects and their visibility. The particular type 
of encoding we adopt for actions is therefore completely 
independent of the robot platforms, and can therefore be 
transferred between robots with different embodiments or 
perceptual systems. In previous work we showed how motor 
skills could be transferred between robots; this paper extends 
this work to action recognition and mirroring. 
Our approach to action representation is consistent with 
and inspired by the 'teleological framework' [43, 44] that 
represents actions by relating three relevant aspects of reality 
(action, goal-state, and situational constraints) through the 
inferential 'principle of rational action', which assumes that: 
(a) the basic function of actions is to bring about future goal 
states; and that (b) agents will always perform the most 
efficient means action available to them within the 
constraints of the given situation.  This approach is 
complimentary to existing approaches that take the “means” 
(e.g; aspects of demonstrated trajectories) into account [29, 
36, 45].  Future research should consider how to combine 
these approaches. 
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